目录
摘要II
关键词II
AbstractIII
引言
引言1
一、文献综述1
（一）高管薪酬与公司业绩关系的研究1
1．国外研究 1
2．国内研究 2
（二）“限薪令”的相关研究2
1.国外研究2
2.国内研究2
二、理论分析及研究假设3
（一）高管薪酬激励对公司业绩的影响3
（二）“限薪令”对高管薪酬激励效果的影响3
三、样本与数据处理3
（一）样本选择与数据来源3
（二）变量设置与衡量4
（三）模型构建4
四、实证分析4
（一）变量描述性统计4
（二）相关性分析5
（三）回归分析6
（四）稳健性检验 7
五、结论及政策建议8
（一）研究结论8
（二）政策建议8
参考文献8
致谢10
高管薪酬激励对上市公司业绩影响的实证研究
——基于“限薪令”的实施背景
摘 要
本文研究高管薪酬对于公司业绩的激励影响，及其在2015年“高管限薪令”的实施背景下的影响变化，并比较国企和非国企高管的薪酬激励效果变化。研究结果发现：（1）和同时期的非国企高管薪酬相比较，“限薪令”降低了国企高管薪酬的增长速度，包括所有高管平均薪酬和前三名高管平均薪酬；（2）“限薪令”使得国企业绩下滑，并且国企的业绩总体低于非国企；（3）高管薪酬激励对公司业绩具有显著正向影响，两者是显著弱相关的；（4）随着限薪令的颁布，国企高管薪酬对公司业绩的激励效果相比非国企降低。
Title An empirical study on the impact of executive compensation incentives on the performance of listed companies
ABSTRACT
This paper studies the incentive impact  *51今日免费论文网|www.51jrft.com +Q: ￥351916072￥ 
of executive compensation on the companys performance and its influence changes in the context of the implementation of the Executive Pay Limit Order in 2015, and compares the changes in the effectiveness of compensation incentives for executives in stateowned and nonstateowned enterprises. The results found that: (1) Compared with the nonstateowned enterprise executive pay of the same period, the ‘salary limit order’ reduced the growth rate of executive pay in stateowned enterprises, including the average executive pay of all the top three executives; (2) The ‘salary limit order’ caused the performance of stateowned enterprises to decline, and the performance of stateowned enterprises overall lower than that of nonstateowned enterprises; (3) executive compensation incentives have a significant positive impact on the performance of the company, executive compensation and the companys performance is weakly related; and (4) the promulgation of the salary limit order makes the incentive effect of so on the performance of stateowned enterprises lower than that of nonstateowned enterprises.
KEY WORDS： Salary Limit Order; Executive Compensation; Company Performance; Correlation；Incentive Effect
现代企业所有者和经营者身份的分离，使得双方的利益需求存在着差异。由于市场信息不对称，可能会带来道德风险和逆向选择问题。委托人为了自身利益，不得不加强对于代理人的监督，从而增加了其代理成本，带来了“委托代理”问题。因此为了解决这个问题，国内外国学者在不断研究探索如何能在降低代理成本的同时不损害股东财富，实现双赢。人们发现高管薪酬激励在一定程度上能够以激励代监督，平衡满足委托人与代理人的利益需求。随着公司治理的日益完善，作为其组成部分的高管薪酬激励制度也在不断发展完善。

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